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The History Problem: The Politics of War Commemoration in
East Asia
Hiro Saito
Abstract: This essay summarizes my argument
in  The History  Problem:  The Politics  of  War
Commemoration  in  East  Asia.  The  history
problem is essentially a relational phenomenon
that arises when nations promote self-serving
versions  of  the  past  by  focusing  on  what
happened  to  their  own  citizens  with  little
regard for foreign others. East Asia, however,
has recently also witnessed the emergence of a
cosmopolitan  form  of  commemoration  taking
humanity,  rather  than  nationality,  as  its
p r imary  f r ame  o f  r e f e rence .  When
cosmopolitan commemoration is practiced as a
collective endeavor by both perpetrators and
victims, a resolution of the history problem will
finally become possible.
Ke ywo r d s :  E a s t  A s i a ,  m em o r y ,
commemoration,  history,  Asia-Pacific  War,
nationalism,  cosmopolitanism
Seventy years have passed since the end of the
Asia-Pacific War, yet Japan remains embroiled
in controversy with its neighbors over the war’s
commemoration.  Among  the  many  points  of
contention  between  Japan,  China,  and  South
Korea  are  interpretations  of  the  Tokyo  War
Crimes Trial,  apologies and compensation for
foreign victims of Japanese aggression, prime
ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and
the war’s portrayal in textbooks. Collectively,
these controversies have come to be called the
“history  problem.”  But  why has  the  problem
become so intractable? Can it be resolved, and
if  so,  how?  These  question  motivated  me to
write  the  book  The  History  Problem:  The
Politics  of  War Commemoration in  East  Asia
(Honolulu: University of University of Hawai'i
Press, 2016).
Yasukuni Shrine, Tokyo, Japan
Why Has the History Problem Become So
Intractable?
In essence, East Asia’s history problem is a set
of complexly entangled controversies over how
to  commemorate  the  Asia-Pacific  War.  The
problem is comprised of multiple controversies
dealing with diverse issues that have their own
political dynamics and historical trajectories. In
this sense, it may be more appropriate to speak
of  “h is tory  problems”  in  the  p lura l .
Nevertheless, these multiple controversies are
historically  homologous—tracing  back  to
Japan’s  actions  during  the  Asia-Pacific
War—and  inextricably  entangled  to  form  a
more or less bounded domain of public debates
and policy problems.
The  controversies  are  also  structurally
homologous in the sense that they pertain to
commemoration.  Although  commemoration
frequently oversimplifies and even distorts, the
act of remembering the past is indispensable to
 APJ | JF 15 | 15 | 4
2
social  life  because  it  enables  people  to
articulate  their  collective  identity.  However,
disjunctive  commemorations  can  become
sources  of  controversy  and  even  conflict
between  groups  precisely  because  the
foundations of their collective identities are at
stake. For this reason, history problems are not
unique to East Asia but commonplace around
the world.
Bu t  con t rove r sy  and  con f l i c t  o ve r
commemoration of the past become intractable
when  they  intersect  with  nationalism,  a
political  doctrine  and  cultural  idiom  that
divides  the  world  into  discrete  national
communities.  When people commemorate the
past according to the logic of nationalism, they
focus on their conationals, whether heroes or
victims,  without  sufficient  regard  for  foreign
others. Moreover, nationalism excludes foreign
others from commemoration in another sense:
the principle of national sovereignty prohibits
foreign others from participating in the process
of  shaping  the  content  of  commemoration.
When  a  government  plans  a  memorial
ceremony for war dead at a national cemetery,
for example, it typically does not allow foreign
governments  to  influence  the  content  of  the
ceremony.
"Family  Ruined,"  Nanjing  Massacre
Memorial  Hall,  Nanjing,  China
By doubly  excluding foreign others  from the
content  and  process  of  commemoration,
nationalist logic prompts people to embrace a
certain version of the past as a foundation of
their national identity. Not surprisingly then, if
nationalist  commemorations  collide,  intense
controversy can result. Contradictory versions
of the past, each predicated on the negation of
the  foreign  other,  is  a  recipe  for  escalating
mutual distrust and denunciation. Specifically,
nationalist commemorations in East Asia have
revolved around the historical judgment of the
Tokyo  Trial.  On  the  one  hand,  Japanese
n a t i o n a l i s t s  a r t i c u l a t e  t h e i r
commemoration—Japan fought  a  just  war for
self-defense and liberation of Asia—by rejecting
the Tokyo Judgment as victor’s justice. On the
other  hand,  Chinese  and  South  Korean
nationalists blame Japan entirely for the history
problem, consistent with the trial that judged
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Japan as solely and entirely guilty of the war.
In short, East Asia’s history problem needs to
be understood as relationally constituted. Even
though Japan’s nationalist commemoration is a
primary cause of the problem, it is only through
its collision with nationalist commemorations in
China  and  South  Korea  that  the  history
problem  has  become  intractable.2
The  Coexistence  of  Nationalism  and
Cosmopolitanism
The interaction of nationalist commemorations
alone,  however,  does  not  adequately  explain
the  dynamic  of  East  Asia’s  history  problem.
This  is  because nationalism is  no longer the
only logic of commemoration available today.
As Ulrich Beck and his colleagues have argued,
cosmopolitanism, an orientation of openness to
foreign others, is increasingly institutionalized
in  a  variety  of  human  practices  in  the
contemporary  wor ld ,  thanks  to  the
globalization of human-rights discourse and the
growing  sociocultural  interactions  across
national borders.3 Cosmopolitanism presents an
alternative logic of feeling, thinking, and acting
that takes humanity, rather than nationality, as
a primary frame of reference. Drawing on the
logic  of  cosmopolitanism,  people  can include
foreign others in commemoration in two ways:
they  remember  what  happened  to  foreign
others as members of humanity, but they also
invite those others to contribute to shaping the
content of commemoration.
Consistent  with  a  worldwide  trend,  the
Japanese  government  began  to  incorporate
cosmopolitanism in its official commemoration
in  the  early  1990s.  When  the  Liberal
Democratic  Party  (LDP),  a  defender  of
nationalist  commemoration,  was  temporarily
ousted from power,  non-LDP prime ministers
such  as  Murayama  Tomiichi  officially
apologized for Japan’s past wrongdoings. These
gestures  of  contrit ion  expressed  the
cosmopolitan  logic  of  commemoration  and,
during  the  last  few  decades,  Japan’s  official
commemoration has come to exhibit a complex
mixture  o f  nat ional is t  def iance  and
cosmopolitan  contrition—even  Koizumi
Jun’ichirō and Abe Shinzō, whose visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine sparked so much controversy,
maintained the so-called Murayama statement.
“Statue of Peace” comfort woman statue,
Seoul, South Korea
Perhaps  more  important ,  a  growing
transnational network of historians in East Asia
has begun to critically reassess the historical
judgment  of  the Tokyo Trial  that  had fueled
nationalist resentments in Japan and justified
one-sided  criticisms  of  Japan  by  China  and
South Korea.  Indeed,  the  joint  projects  have
shown  the  potential  to  encourage  Japanese
citizens to fully commemorate the suffering of
South  Korean  and  Chinese  victims  by
confronting the full magnitude of Japan’s past
wrongdoings, as well as to encourage Chinese
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and South Korean citizens to reflect on their
own nationalism and  commemorate  the  war,
including  Japanese  victimhood,  from  a  more
cosmopolitan perspective.4
Cosmopolitan commemoration, however, is not
replacing nationalist commemoration in a zero-
sum manner. Instead, the relationship between
the  two  is  open-ended  because  nationalism
continues  to  operate  as  a  central  organizing
principle in the contemporary world. Since both
nationalism  and  cosmopolitanism  are
legitimated, this creates what sociologists call
an  “institutional  contradiction,”  wherein
contradictory  but  equally  legitimate  logics
clash  with  each  other.5  This  institutional
contradiction serves as a focal point of political
struggles  for  the  legitimate  commemoration,
and these struggles are likely to be intense and
protracted  because  all  sides,  subscribing  to
nationalism and cosmopolitanism in their own
way, have reasonable claims to legitimacy.
Can the History Problem Be Resolved, and
If So, How?
Thus, the future of the history problem remains
much uncertain, but my answer to the question
“Can the history problem be resolved, and if so,
how?” is cautiously affirmative. My answer is
cautious because nationalist commemorations,
focusing on the suffering of conationals without
sufficient  regard  for  foreign  others,  persist
throughout the region and beyond, overwhelm
historians’ critical reflections, and threaten to
prolong the history problem. My answer is also
affirmative because the region has witnessed
t h e  em e r g e n c e  o f  c o sm o p o l i t a n
commemoration  based  on  the  transnational
network  of  historians  as  well  as  educators,
nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs),  and
concerned citizens who have come to recognize
the suffering of victims of the Asia-Pacific War
irrespective of nationality.
In a way, this book is a response to a famous
passage  in  the  speech  that  Richard  von
Weizsäcker  del ivered  on  the  fortieth
anniversary  of  the  end  of  World  War  II:
“Anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind
to the present. Whoever refuses to remember
the  inhumanity  is  prone  to  new  risks  of
infection.”6  When  people  inside  and  outside
Japan  criticize  the  Japanese  government  for
failing  to  adequately  commemorate  Japan’s
past  wrongdoings,  they  often  quote  this
passage.  Yet  critics  rarely  probe  three
questions buried within Weizsäcker’s  speech:
Which inhumanity should be remembered, how
should it  be remembered,  and precisely how
will remembrance of past inhumanity prevent
future tragedies?
“A-Bomb  Dome,”  Hiroshima  Peace
Memorial  Park,  Hiroshima,  Japan
Simply put, the inhumanities on all sides in the
Asia-Pacific  War  need  to  be  commemorated
according to the logic of cosmopolitanism. As
Herbert Kelman observed, former enemies can
move toward reconciliation if they manage to
revise their previously incompatible identities,
but this “revision in the group’s identity and
the associated narrative is possible only if the
core  of  the  identity  remains  intact.”7  This
means  that  Japanese  citizens  will  likely
commemorate  the  suffering  of  Chinese  and
South Korean victims more extensively if their
own  dual  identity  as  both  perpetrator  and
victim remains intact. Put another way, while
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Japan needs to embrace a greater degree of
contrition  first,  China  and  South  Korea  will
have to recognize that Japan, too, suffered, if a
cosmopolitan resolution is to be achieved. This
cosmopolitan  commemoration  on  the  part  of
China and South Korea can help move Japan to
fully  accept  its  war  responsibility  because
doing so will  no longer threaten the core of
Japan’s dual identity.
Thus,  cosmopolitan  commemoration  needs  to
be  envisioned  as  a  collective  endeavor,  and
such mutual cosmopolitan commemoration has
the potential  to prevent “future infection” by
bringing  the  three  countries  together  within
the horizon of common humanity that recasts
the logic of nationalism. The question remains,
however,  how  willing  the  governments  and
citizens in the three countries are to further the
transnational  network as an infrastructure of
mutual cosmopolitan commemoration.
Looking Ahead
I  acknowledge  that  observers  of  the  history
problem,  including myself,  can  never  remain
neutral.  In  fact,  researchers  who  offer
empirical observations are part and parcel of
the  history  problem  because  they  provide
policymakers,  NGOs,  and  concerned  citizens
with  languages  and  rationales  for  justifying
their  commemorative  positions  and  framing
their preferred solutions. The goal of this book
is not to impose on the public a certain version
of the history problem in the name of academic
research but to facilitate a timely and candid
multinational  dialogue  involving  researchers
and  c i t izens  to  col lect ively  improve
understanding  of  the  history  problem.
In fact, my own understanding of the history
problem  has  evolved  since  I  completed  the
book.  Specifically,  I  have  realized  that  the
persistent legacy of Cold War geopolitics in the
region,  as  critically  analyzed  by  Chen Kuan-
Hsing, is key to explaining the recent trajectory
of the history problem.8
Take,  for  example,  the  U.S.-Japan  Security
Treaty,  originally  signed in  the  midst  of  the
Cold War that had turned “hot” on the Korean
Peninsula. Even though Japan’s economic ties
with  China  and  South  Korea  have  grown
significantly  since  the  late  1980s,  Japan’s
foreign policy remains firmly anchored in the
security treaty. In fact, conservative politicians
in Japan increasingly emphasize the importance
of  the U.S.-Japan alliance to counter China’s
military expansion as well as a North Korean
nuclear  threat.  This  is  why  Barack  Obama’s
visit to Hiroshima in May 2016 failed to set a
moral example for Japanese leaders to follow in
coming  t o  t e rms  w i th  J apan ’ s  pas t
wrongdoings, but instead provided an excuse
for  downplaying  the  need  for  contrition—by
emphasizing  the  strong  U.S.-Japan  alliance.
Japan does not need to fear China. Indeed, a
nationalist  wish  for  a  strong  Japan,  coupled
with  longstanding  disregard  for  China  and
“Asia,”  wil l  keep  the  history  problem
intractable.
Similarly, the legacy of the Cold War has stifled
Japan’s  relations  with  South  Korea.  The
Japanese  government  has  been  reluctant  to
compensate former “comfort women” and other
victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings not simply
because  of  the  1965  normalization  treaty
between the two countries. This reluctance is
deeply  rooted  in  the  sense  of  injustice  that
conservative politicians, as well as a significant
number  of  Japanese  citizens,  have  harbored
over the Tokyo Trial—a case of compromised
transitional  justice  at  the  outset  of  the  Cold
War. Japanese conservative politicians feel that
it is unfair to be asked to compensate former
“comfort  women”  and  other  foreign  victims
when the suffering of Japanese victims of the
atomic  bombings  and  other  atrocities
committed  by  the  Allied  powers  remains
unredressed.9  These  multiple  unredressed
injustices in the Asia-Pacific, as Lisa Yoneyama
pointed out,  have become interlocked to fuel
the  politics  of  war  memory  and  transitional
justice on a transnational scale.10
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To  deepen  understanding  of  the  history
problem, then, it will be crucial to expand the
scope of analysis beyond East Asia and situate
Japan’s relations with China and South Korea
within the persistent legacy of the Cold War
geopolitics vis-à-vis the changing reality of the
Asia-Pacific region.11
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